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Abstract: 
The mismatch between credit repayments and income seasonality poses a challenge for 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) working in developing countries. For instance, in northern 
Bangladesh, income and consumption downfalls during the lean season after the transplanting 
of major paddy crops are a serious threat to a household’s economy. Poor landless agricultural 
wage laborers suffer the most owing to this seasonality as they face difficulties in smoothing 
their consumption. However, in designing microcredit products, MFIs do not usually provide 
flexibility or seasonal adjustment during the lean season. This is mainly because MFIs are afraid 
that such flexibility might break the repayment discipline of borrowers, resulting in higher 
default rates. We thus conducted a randomized controlled trial in 2011–12 in northern 
Bangladesh to empirically test whether seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit leads to an 
increase in repayment problems for MFIs as well as whether it can increase and stabilize 
consumption of borrower households. Our results suggest no statistically discernible difference 
among the treatment arms in case of default, overdue amount, or repayment frequency. On the 
other hand, we find no positive impact of repayment flexibility on immediate food consumption 
during the period of seasonality, except for in-kind full moratorium treatment group. After a 
year of initial intervention, however, we see positive changes in food intake during the lean 
season. Thus, our preliminary results are in favor of seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit.  
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1. Introduction 
Given the current global move to fight poverty and hunger, it is important to understand the 
seasonal dimension of the poverty and hunger nexus, which regularly and repeatedly affects the 
poor in developing countries. Agriculture-dependent rural poverty can be linked to such distinct 
crop-cycle-based seasonality, and it becomes more severe with adverse periodic climatic 
conditions that might lead to poor-quality harvests or outright crop failure (Chambers et al. 
1981). Moreover, inadequate access to formal credit and insurance products further traps people 
in chronic and inter-generational poverty, which is very difficult to tackle with general 
public-policy measures and social safety-net approaches. 
For example, in Bangladesh, the term “seasonality” is associated with a seasonal food 
deprivation phenomenon known locally as monga; it is most common in northern Bangladesh 
(Khandker and Mahmud 2012). Rural life in Bangladesh revolves around the agricultural cycle, 
which is characterized by three crop seasons that are in turn based on three categories of rice: 
aus (April–August), aman (July/August–November/December; traditionally the most important 
paddy crop), and boro (December/January–April). Owing to this cycle, two major seasonal 
deficits occur: one from late September to early November and the other from late March to 
early May. With the widespread expansion of boro cultivation in recent years, the incidence of 
the lean period in March−May has significantly declined. However, the lean season in 
September−November, which follows the transplantation of the aman crop, still affects most 
parts of the country, especially northwest Bangladesh (Khandker and Mahmud 2012). Almost no 
alternative agricultural activity takes place in this period, and the nonagricultural sector cannot 
sufficiently absorb the seasonally unemployed labor. 
During monga, drastic drops in employment-led income constitute the major reason for 
reduced food consumption; this phenomenon is well documented in the literature (e.g., Rahman 
and Hossain 1995). The lack of income and alternative means for earning limit the population’s 
purchasing power, and this situation cannot be mitigated by the minuscule amounts of assets and 
savings that poor households typically carry. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, on average, the 
number of meals consumed drops significantly during monga and that families having young 
and elderly members suffer the most. The absence of a functional credit market prevents 
households from smoothing their consumption (Pitt and Khandker 2002). As a result, many 
individuals borrow from landlords or informal moneylenders—both of whom tend to charge 
very high interest rates—and subsequently fall into a debt trap. 
Given this status quo, various coping strategies have emerged among the monga-affected 
people of northern Bangladesh. Other than borrowing from informal sources that charge high 
interest rates, common coping strategies include advance sales of labor (Khandker and Mahmud 
2012), the purchase of household essentials on credit, skipping meals during the lean season 
 
 
(Berg and Emran 2011), and seasonal migration (Shonchoy 2011). Of these, temporary seasonal 
migration to urban areas appears to be a relatively practical and rational strategy, as individuals 
can move from rural areas to nearby urban areas or cities for a short period to earn a livelihood 
during the lean season. However, such a migration strategy is not suitable for everyone, owing 
to, for example, family constraints (especially among households with female or disabled heads 
that may be unable to migrate during the lean season); additionally, credit and financing 
constraints, a lack of networking, and asymmetric information problems limit individuals’ 
ability to migrate (Bryan et al. 2012).  
One recent policy development in developing countries is the emergence of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that focus on poverty alleviation. It is argued that, given access to even small 
amounts of credit, entrepreneurs from poor households will find opportunities to engage in 
viable income-generating activities (IGA)—many of which will be secondary to their primary 
occupations—and thus ameliorate poverty themselves. According to the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign, as of 2011, there were 205 million microcredit clients1, more than 110 million of 
whom were women. In 2006, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank were awarded the 
Nobel Prize for Peace for their contributions to poverty reduction, especially in Bangladesh. 
However, among academics, there is no consensus regarding the impact of microcredit on 
income improvement and poverty reduction (Banerjee et al. 2009). Various studies on the 
impact of microcredit in developing countries have found evidence of consumption smoothing, 
asset building (Pitt and Khandker 1998), and poverty reduction (Khandker 2005). Conversely, 
using the same data set as Pitt and Khandker (1998), Morduch (1999) finds that the average 
impact of microfinance is “nonexistent.” 
A major drawback of the microcredit framework is its rigid loan repayment rules (Karlan 
and Mullainathan 2007). Nearly all loan contracts include fixed repayment schedules, which 
involve equal weekly payments along with a high interest rate. However, MFIs work with poor, 
rural people who usually have uncertain and infrequent incomes; these circumstances make it 
very difficult for them to maintain such rigid weekly loan repayments. Especially during the 
lean period—when there are no jobs available in the rural agricultural sector—it can be very 
difficult for the poor to generate income, let alone comply with a loan repayment scheme; 
indeed, it is an understatement to say that rigid weekly repayments during the time of seasonal 
hardship exacerbates their misery. It was found that during monga, households take extreme 
measures—such as selling productive assets (Khandker and Mahmud 2012) or borrowing from 
loan sharks charging extraordinarily high interest rates—to maintain a clean record of 
repayment and ensure access to future microcredit loans from MFIs. 
Using primary data from rural households in Bangladesh, Shonchoy (2009, 2011) shows 
                                                   
1 http://www.microcreditsummit.org 
 
 
that during the lean season, ceteris paribus, access to microcredit does not increase the income 
levels of individuals relative to those with no access to credit. In addition, at the time of survey, 
Shonchoy (2009, 2011) found no MFI that operated a well-targeted microfinance program 
solely dedicated to tackling seasonality issues such as monga. Given that seasonality in northern 
Bangladesh is historically well known, it is particularly puzzling that no leading microcredit 
product, save for PRIME intervention by PKSF2, has been designed to mitigate the effects of 
seasonality by providing some form of moratorium of loan repayment during monga. 
The mismatch between credit repayments and income can create serious distortions that 
deepen the debt trap for some people, especially if they adopt extreme measures to repay loans 
on a weekly basis during the lean period. In this study, we examine whether these distortions are 
inevitable. If MFIs allow flexibility in their microcredit repayment schedules in times of 
uncertain income during lean periods, this may improve the livelihood of the poor, provide them 
with greater flexibility and mobility, and in turn improve their capacity to repay the loan. 
Currently, MFIs are reluctant to relax their loan repayment rules; they seem to fear that allowing 
a moratorium on a weekly repayment scheme during the lean period may adversely affect debt 
repayment discipline. If given seasonal adjustment in repayment, borrowers might become 
behaviorally accustomed to making lower or no repayments, even when the payments are 
required, ultimately leading to lower recovery rates or higher default rates. 
Given this trade-off, it appears that these issues can be appropriately addressed through a 
field experiment featuring a randomized controlled trial (RCT). Numerous RCT studies have 
been undertaken in microfinance-related research, which covers a wide range of topics 
including the impact of microfinance (Banerjee et al. 2009), weekly versus monthly repayments 
(Field and Pande 2008, Field et al. 2012), group versus individual liability (Giné and Karlan 
2011), random variations in meeting frequency (Feigenberg et al. 2011), and variance in a loan’s 
term structure (Field et al. 2013).  
Despite this potential, rigorous evaluation of the impact of such seasonality-adjusted 
flexibility on microcredit design is lacking in the literature. Among the few existing studies, 
Shoji (2010) evaluates the effectiveness of Bangladeshi microfinance following the introduction 
of a contingent repayment system beginning in 2002; this system allowed affected members to 
reschedule savings and installments during times of natural disaster. Using evidence pertaining 
                                                   
2 Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication (PRIME) was introduced in 2006 by Palli Karma–
Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a microcredit wholesaler and umbrella organization in Bangladesh. Under 
the PRIME scheme, individual nongovernment organizations (NGOs) receive credit facilities with 
“flexible” terms, under which the NGOs are free to negotiate credit amounts, repayment schedules, and 
frequency of meetings with the beneficiary as well as impose completely different sets of schemes upon 
various borrowing groups. While this is ideal for beneficiaries to some extent, it is not easy to evaluate 
flexibility in terms that improve the accessibility of beneficiaries to microfinance, performance in IGA, or 
the livelihoods of their families. 
 
 
to flooding in 2004 and on the basis of an instrumental variable approach, Shoji finds that 
rescheduling serves as a safety net by substantially decreasing the probability of borrowers 
skipping meals in response to negative shocks, and this effect was even more pronounced on the 
landless and women. Furthermore, if we focus on studies in the context of monga-related 
seasonal deprivation in northern Bangladesh, we find a similar dearth of qualitative research. 
Khandker and Mahmud (2012) use nonexperimental data to analyze the correlates of seasonal 
deprivation while focusing on social protection programs and microcredit. In India, the 
neighboring country of Bangladesh, Czura et al. (2011) examine the impact of repayment 
flexibility by undertaking a randomized experiment with dairy farmers and show that repayment 
flexibility contributed to consumption smoothing as well as enhanced demand for credit. Apart 
from this study, we are unaware of any rigorous study on the impact of seasonality-adjusted 
repayment flexibility in South Asia based on an RCT design.  
We thus initiated RCT experiments in northern Bangladesh in early 2011. This study 
elucidates the mismatch between seasonality and the terms of microcredit, and clarifies the 
impact of seasonality-adjusted microcredit. In our RCT design, our counterpart NGO first 
formed typical microfinance groups from randomly chosen villages. Borrowers were then 
provided with credit and began making weekly repayments after a short, two-week grace period. 
For a random subsample of these borrower groups, the repayment schedule was relaxed in two 
ways during the designated monga period. Under the first treatment, borrowers were given a 
temporary moratorium, while under the second treatment, the repayment scheme was changed 
to monthly repayments during monga. 
We surveyed 1,440 households belonging to both borrower groups before (baseline) and 
after one year of intervention (endline). We also executed a short monga survey during the 
monga period in 2011 and 2012 to understand the severity of seasonal conditions. Using both 
survey and experimental methods, we empirically analyze the impact of the flexibility schemes 
on repayment and consumption. As a preview of the results, we find no statistically discernible 
difference between the treatment arms in case of default, overdue amount, or repayment 
frequency, while we find a strong positive impact of repayment flexibility on food consumption, 
among other seasonality-affected variables. We believe that our study contributes new insight 
into the consequences of flexible microcredit that is both geographically and seasonally adjusted 
to help the vulnerable and lean season-affected poor cope better with periods of hardship. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our RCT design and field 
surveys. Section 3 investigates the impact of repayment flexibility on borrowers’ repayment 
behavior, while Section 4 investigates its impact on consumption by borrower households. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Experimental Design for Flexible Microcredit Trials  
2.1 RCT Strategy 
(1) Inflexible Microcredit as the Control  
A typical Grameen-style microcredit scheme proceeds as follows (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2010): individuals eligible for microcredit first form a group wherein members are 
expected to help each other in times of difficulty. Not all members can borrow immediately. 
Usually, only some members are offered credit after all members have saved a small amount of 
money on a regular basis; the rest are given credit after the first borrowers successfully repay 
several installments and all members have continued to save the same small amount on a regular 
basis. Weekly repayments begin without a long grace period. With typical Grameen-type 
microcredit, the first lent amount is small and is to be repaid in 50 weekly installments within 
12 months.  
Several rationales have been offered for this rigid repayment schedule (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2010). The success of frequent repayment in minimizing default and delay could be 
attributed to the early warning mechanism, the lender’s capture of information vis-à-vis the 
income flow of the borrower, and the borrower’s commitment to save regularly. Repayment in 
group meetings in front of others also drives regular repayment by borrowers who prefer to 
maintain their reputation within the village.  
Probably because of these mechanisms, classic Grameen-type microcredit has been 
successful in maintaining high repayment rates.3 However, regularly attending weekly meetings 
puts a high burden on the borrowers in terms of the opportunity costs of their time and financial 
stress (Field et al. 2012). Borrowers are thus demanding the relaxation of several classic 
Grameen-type features. Academic research has responded to this request by attempting to 
identify the key element in guaranteeing high repayment rates. For example, using a field 
experiment approach, Giné and Karlan (2011) evaluate the impact of removing group liability in 
the Philippines; they find no adverse impact on repayment as long as public and frequent 
repayment systems were maintained. On the other hand, recent studies based on RCT studies 
that compare weekly versus monthly installments show mixed results. In India, Field and Pande 
(2008) show no difference between microfinance schemes with weekly and monthly repayment 
frequencies as long as repayments were made in public meetings. The same RCT also shows 
that a change from weekly to monthly repayment greatly reduced borrowers’ financial stress 
(Field et al. 2012). In contrast, in Indonesia, Feigenberg et al. (2011) find that repayment 
performance was better with weekly rather than monthly repayments.  
Given this background, we adopt the following borrowing and repayment scheme as the 
                                                   
3 See Kurosaki and Khan (2012) for an exceptional case wherein an MFI suffered from high default rates 
despite adopting a Grameen-type credit scheme. In their case, strategic default prevailed among 
borrowers owing to weak enforcement of the contingent renewal rule. 
 
 
control. Borrowers obtain individual credit contract of BDT 3,0004 in a group setting with 
individual liability and begin repayment after a short, two-week grace period. Repayments are 
made in 45 installments, each for BDT 75 (except for the last one, which is BDT 60), implying a 
gross interest payment of BDT 360 spread throughout the borrowing period of approximately 
one year. Each weekly installment is to be repaid by the borrower at a group level weekly 
meeting. The borrower is obliged to attend the weekly meeting, even during the monga period. 
This design of traditional or inflexible microcredit scheme is denoted as the “Control.” 
 
(2) Flexible Microcredit as the Treatment  
During the monga period, microcredit borrowers may face difficulties in obtaining the 
money needed for regular repayment. To facilitate the demand for repayment flexibility within 
this context, the treatment relaxes the repayment schedule in two ways during the monga period, 
which in this study is designated as September 20–December 20. 
Under the first treatment, “Flexible 1,” a temporary moratorium is applied to repayments 
during the designated monga period. During this moratorium, households within the Flexible 1 
groups do not make any payment. After the monga period, borrowers begin paying BDT 100 per 
week, making their total repayment amount and repayment period identical to those of the 
Control group. 
As a variant of the first treatment, one-third of those treated with Flexible 1 also receive 
IGA support. We refer to this treatment as “Flexible 1 + IGA.” Under IGA support, instead of 
providing cash, we provide microcredit borrowers with a productive asset of their choice, within 
the credit amount, along with advice for utilizing the asset; no further subsidy is provided. 
Under the second flexibility treatment, the repayment schedule is changed to feature three 
monthly installments of BDT 300 each during the designated monga period, instead of 12 
weekly repayments of BDT 75 each. After the monga period, borrowers resume paying BDT 75 
per week, ensuring that their total repayment amount and repayment period is the same as those 
of the control group. We refer to this treatment as “Flexible 2.” This treatment arm provides less 
flexibility (in terms of loan repayment obligation) and better loan collection discipline than does 
Flexible 1.  
 
(3) Randomization of Treatment Arms 
To preclude unequal treatment among members within a group, we randomized the four 
treatment statuses at the borrower–group level. Since our counterpart NGO usually forms one 
group in one village, our randomization took place at the village level.  
                                                   
4  BDT 100 is equivalent to approximately JPY 99 or USD 1.22; BDT 3,000 therefore equals 
approximately USD 37. 
 
 
Of the 90 villages under potential treatment by the counterpart NGO, we randomly selected 
12 for Control, 24 for Flexible 1, 12 for Flexible 1 + IGA, and 24 for Flexible 2. In the 
randomization, we stratified the villages on the basis of their distance from the closest bus 
station and the location type of the village (see the next subsection).  
The reason for the larger number of villages under Flexible 1 and Flexible 2 than under 
Flexible 1 + IGA and Control was that our initial design had another experiment dimension, 
distinguished by the timing of when borrower groups would be delivered the information about 
the repayment schedule being relaxed. The intention was to create exogenous variation in the 
information structure, as implemented by Karlan and Zinman (2009) in the context of consumer 
credit in South Africa. However, owing to delays in group formation and loan disbursement (our 
schedule of experiment unfortunately overlapped with the holy month of Ramadan), the exact 
timing of the announcement became similar across all groupings. Therefore, in analyzing the 
impact of our experiment, we eventually merged the two types of treatments (initially designed 
as “surprise” and “pre-announced flexibility”). 
In each village, our counterpart NGO formed a borrower group known as samity, 
comprising 20 members who satisfied the NGO’s microcredit criteria and who had voiced 
interest in receiving microcredit. Loan officers then recorded member names in the samity 
formation book. In the book, each samity member was assigned a number in ascending order; 
members assigned 1–15 were to be offered credit, while those assigned 16–20 were kept in the 
group as observers. This randomization design was not known to samity members nor to the 
loan officers prior announcement of the treatments, and it thus implies the following sample 
distribution: there are 72 sample villages and 1,440 sample households, one-sixth or one-third of 
which fall into one of the four treatment arm categories; three-fourths of the sample households 
(1,080 households) were actual borrowers of microcredit. 
 
2.2 Implementation of Surveys and RCT Interventions 
(1) Counterpart NGO and Study Area 
Our counterpart NGO is Gono Unnayan Kendra (GUK), which operates in the greater 
Gaibandha area, comprising five districts in northern Bangladesh: Gaibandha, Kurigram, 
Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, and Nilphamari. It has offices in all 32 upazillas (subdistricts) in 
Gaibandha district and five offices in the Kurigram district. Prior to this study, GUK had limited 
experience in running traditional microfinance; on the other hand, it had already been a 
promoter of flexible microfinance in combination with its reportedly successful “asset transfer” 
program, which was financed by international donors. However, since its asset transfer program 
contains a large subsidy component, it is not clear how much of its success vis-à-vis outreach to 
the ultrapoor can be attributed to their flexibility in repayment design per se. For instance, under 
 
 
one of GUK’s programs, ultrapoor beneficiaries were provided with a livestock animal and were 
required to return the offspring or an equivalent monetary value. This design also implies a 
significantly longer grace period than that in traditional microcredit. 
In the study area, poverty is concentrated in so-called char areas. Char literally means 
“river island” and is an area of land regularly formed from river bed sediment eroded by major 
rivers in Bangladesh. People living on char islands tend to be poorer and more vulnerable to 
various types of natural disasters (Khandker and Mahmud 2012). Therefore, our experiments 
distinguished between char, river basin, and river adjacent inland areas (hereafter “Inlands”) 
where our target group—i.e., the poor and vulnerable—live. More concretely, in our 
randomization, we stratified villages on the basis of their distance from the closest bus station 
and the village location types (char, river basin, or inland areas). Table 1 shows the distribution 
of our final sample villages. Forty-five of the 72 sample villages (62.5% of the sample) were in 
Gaibandha district; the rest (37.5%) were in the Kurigram district. Eighteen of the 72 sample 
villages (25.0% of the sample) were in char areas, 42 (58.3%) were in river adjacent inland 
areas, and the remaining 12 (16.7%) were in river basin areas. 
 
(2) Schedule of Surveys and Experiments in the Field 
Figure 1 shows the timeline of our surveys and experiments. In the first half of 2011, we 
visited Gaibandha and GUK to undertake preparatory investigations and make logistical 
arrangements. After our agreement with GUK regarding the research design, village-level 
randomization was implemented, followed by the formation of a samity. The baseline survey 
(Panel 1) of 1,440 households was executed in July–September 2011; it captured detailed 
information on factors such as household composition; education; health, including the weights 
of the children; occupation; assets; income; migration experiences; agricultural production; 
nonagricultural enterprises; saving; credit; debt; and monga coping. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In the first three weeks of September 2011, microcredit of BDT 3,000 was issued to 
three-fourths of our sample households. Our initial plan was to issue the microcredit earlier. 
However, due to the holy month of Ramadan and the subsequent festival of Eid-ul-Fitr, 
disbursement was delayed. As a result, households who received flexible microcredit entered the 
designated monga period before the due date of their first repayment installment. Nevertheless, 
GUK was able to collect monthly installments (Flexible 2) and larger weekly installments in the 
post-monga period (Flexible 1) without experiencing serious delays or nonrepayment problems. 
As designed, in all villages, 15 samity members were issued credit (i.e., three-fourths of samity 
members). 
After the RCT experiments began, three additional surveys were executed: the first monga 
 
 
survey (Panel 2) in November 2011, the follow-up survey (Panel 3) in July–August 2012, and 
the second monga survey (Panel 4) in November–December 2012. Panel 1 (the baseline survey) 
and Panel 3 were based on the long questionnaire, which covers all aspects of the household 
economy; Panel 2 and Panel 4 were based on the short questionnaire, which focused on how the 
household was coping with ongoing monga difficulties. Panel 1 captured the state of affairs 
before our interventions, Panel 2 described the household economy during our interventions, 
and Panels 3 and 4 collected information after our RCT experiments. In Panels 1 and 2, 1,440 
households were surveyed. In Panels 3 and 4, 1,422 of the initial 1,440 households were 
resurveyed, implying an attrition rate of 1.25%.  
In addition, administrative data for all non-attrited borrowers (i.e., 1,068 borrowers) were 
obtained from GUK. This data set provides detailed and precise information on repayment 
behavior.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of our final sample households. Data for the full set of 1,440 
household observations surveyed in Panel 1 are utilized as the baseline information. Data for the 
subset of 1,080 borrowers are utilized in Section 3, in which the impact of flexibility on 
repayment behavior is investigated. Data for the subset of 1,422 Panel 3 households are utilized 
in Section 4, in which the impact of flexibility on food consumption is investigated.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.3 Validity of Randomization 
As our randomization was properly implemented, we expect no systematic difference in 
pre-intervention characteristics at the village level across treatment arms. To test this, we 
estimated the following village-level regression model using the baseline survey data: 
 
Xv = b0 + b1D1v + b2D2v + b3D3v + uv,                      (1) 
 
where Xv is a pre-intervention variable for village v, Djv is a dummy variable for treatment j (j = 
1, 2, 3; i.e., Flexible 1, Flexible 1 + IGA, and Flexible 2, respectively), and uv is a zero mean 
error term. If the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 is not rejected, the balance test is passed. 
Similarly, we expect no systematic difference in pre-intervention characteristics at the 
household level across treatment arms. 5  To test this, we estimated the following 
household-level regression model using the baseline survey data: 
 
                                                   
5 A difference might exist at the household level across treatment arms, as treatments were randomized at 
the village level. For example, Czura et al. (2011) state that “Differences in client characteristics are due 
to the fact that randomization occurred at the group level and groups form according to socioeconomic 
characteristics” (p.10). 
 
 
Xh = b0 + b1D1h + b2D2h + b3D3h + b4D4h + uh,                (2) 
 
where Xh is a pre-intervention variable for household h, Djh (j = 1, 2, 3) is a dummy variable 
indicating that household h was provided with flexible microcredit under treatment arm j (j = 1, 
2, 3; i.e., Flexible 1, Flexible 1 + IGA, and Flexible 2, respectively), D4h is a dummy for 
nonborrower households, and uh is a zero mean error term. If the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = 
b3 = 0 is not rejected, the balance test is passed. If no selection bias occurred in assigning 
borrower versus non-borrower households within each samity, we expect b4 to be zero as well. 
Because randomization was implemented at the village level, and sample households were 
drawn using the village as the primary sampling unit, we used robust standard errors for b’s 
clustered at the village level in order to test the null hypotheses using Equation (2). 
Appendix Table 1 shows the results for village-level variables. At the village level, the 
distance from the closest bus station to the village, the dummy for a char village, and the 
dummy for an inland village were perfectly orthogonal to the treatment, confirming our 
randomization strategy. For all six variables that represent village-level public facilities (bazar, 
college, Hindu temple, town, bus stand,6 and railway station), the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = 
b3 = 0 was not rejected even at the 10% level. In this sense, the balance test at the village level 
was passed, suggesting that our randomization strategy at the village level was properly 
implemented.  
Appendix Table 2 shows the regression results for household-level variables using four 
variables characterizing the household head, six variables characterizing household members, 
five variables characterizing land holdings, and five variables characterizing liquid asset 
ownership. All variables were compiled from the baseline survey data.7 Of the 20 variables 
analyzed in Appendix Table 2, in only two cases (i.e., ratio of adults in the household roster and 
literacy rate of adult females) was the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 rejected at the 5% 
level; in only three cases (i.e., household size, average age of members, and ratio of adults) was 
the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = b4 = 0 rejected at the 5% level. If we individually assess 
the significance of b1, b2, and b3, again we find that only one case (i.e., b3 for ratio of adults in 
the household roster) was statistically significant at the 5% level. At most, the balance check 
only marginally failed for the four variables of household size, average age, adult ratio, and 
adult female literacy rate. We can therefore safely conclude that these rejections occurred by 
chance and that randomization was properly implemented. As shown in Section 4, the 
                                                   
6 The “bus stand” here refers to the availability of any bus stand in the village, while the “bus station” 
used in our randomization strata refers to the distance from the closest bus station where medium- and 
long- distance bus services are available. 
7 To be more precise, owing to data entry problems, we used Panel 3 data for the household demography 
variables (age was adjusted by one year), supplemented by Panel 1 data for the 22 attrition households. 
For land and assets, we used Panel 1 data. 
 
 
nonrandom components at the household level do not affect our impact analysis (see the 
robustness check undertaken by controlling for these baseline household-level variables). 
 
2.3 Issues with Attirition 
For the impact analysis, we use the GUK administrative data as well as microdata collected 
in the resurvey (Panel 3, July–August 2012) and the second monga survey (Panel 4, November–
December 2012) of the 1,440 households included in the baseline survey. The resurvey covered 
1,422 households, implying an attrition rate of 1.25%. Although this rate is low, we need to 
consider the possibility of attrition bias, if the attrition happened in a nonrandom manner. In the 
third panel of Table 1, we show the distribution of resurveyed households across treatment arms. 
As shown in the table, attrition occurred among households in villages under Flexible 1, 
Flexible 1 + IGA, and Flexible 2, while attrition did not occur among households in the Control 
villages. According to chi-squared tests, the dropout dummy and treatment status were 
independent.8 Furthermore, the village and household characteristics found to be marginally 
correlated with the treatment did not have any explanatory power when we regressed the 
dropout dummy on these variables (see Appendix Table 3). Therefore, it is safe to assume that 
the analysis used in this paper using resurvey data and administrative data does not pose any 
concern of attrition bias.  
 
3. Impact of Flexibility on Repayment Behavior 
In this section, we examine repayment behavior to test whether seasonal adjustment in 
microcredit affects the default rate and repayment delays. Through this examination, we assess 
the general claims by the NGOs vis-à-vis a moratorium during monga.  
 
3.1 Extent of Default and Absence in Weekly Meetings 
(1) Definition and Summary Statistics of Empirical Variables 
We compiled two sets of empirical variables that characterize the extent of repayment 
problems. Table 2 shows the definitions and summary statistics of these variables. 
The first set of empirical variables is based on information concerning a borrower’s 
payment due at the end of a loan cycle. The first variable, default, is defined as a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the overdue amount is positive, and zero otherwise. On 
average, 73% of borrowers had a positive overdue amount at the end of the loan cycle. The 
                                                   
8 We first tested the independence between the attrition dummy and five household status (Flexible 1, 
Flexible 1 + IGA, Flexible 2, Control, and Nonborrower). The chi-squared statistics with the degree of 
freedom (dof.) at 4 was 4.257, whose p-value was 0.370. We then tested the same null excluding Control 
households as there was no attrition among this group. The chi-squared statistics with dof at 3 was 1.4654, 
whose p-value was 0.690. 
 
 
second variable, overdue, is a continuous variable for the absolute amount of delinquency; it had 
a mean of BDT 556.14. We can convert this into a relative number by dividing it by the total 
due amount (BDT 3,360). On average, the overdue amount was equivalent to 17% of their 
required accumulated amount at the end of the loan cycle. However, the same calculation 
adjusted with savings (where total saving amount is adjusted with the due amount, six months 
after the schedule loan cycle) indicates that on average, around 51% of people had a positive 
overdue with the average amount outstanding being 9.52% of the required accumulated amount. 
Therefore, although the incidence of default was frequent, the overdue amount was, on average, 
small in both absolute and relative terms.  
The second set of empirical variables is based on information on the number of weekly 
meetings missed by borrowers. MFIs typically impose a strict loan collection regime, wherein 
each borrower must pay weekly loan installments of equal amounts. However, in our 
experimental design, we instructed GUK not to impose strict loan repayment discipline. Instead, 
we instructed GUK to conduct weekly household visits, hold weekly meetings, and inform each 
borrower of the cumulative due amount. This was undertaken, in particular, to observe the loan 
collection pattern and behavior of loan repayment among borrowers. In our definition, “missed 
weeks” includes only those cases wherein the borrowers did not pay at all9 and had not earned 
any credit toward one or more missed weeks of payments. On average, borrowers missed 
payments by about six weeks under this definition. The average ratio of total missed weeks to 
total loan collection weeks (variable rmiss) was 0.18, or 18%. Therefore, although the overdue 
amount was small on average, borrowers missed meetings frequently, at an average rate of one 
in six. 
As discussed in Section 2, our experimental design used as randomization strata three 
distinct geographical properties: the char, river basin, and inland areas. Borrowers in char areas 
had more repayment difficulties than those in the other two areas if we focus on two variables 
for overdue amount at the end of a loan cycle (default, and overdue). As char households 
typically face greater difficulties in ensuring a regular flow of income and recurrently suffer as a 
result of seasonal adversity, we expect char households to have more difficulty making regular 
repayments compared with other households. This expectation was met regarding the overdue 
amount and default status, as depicted in Figure 2.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
(2) Seasonality 
One important aspect of this loan repayment analysis is understanding the impact of 
seasonality on total collections and weekly repayments. To examine any pattern of seasonality, 
Figure 3 plots monthly loan collections and missed weeks information.  
                                                   
9 Partial payment would not result in missed weeks. 
 
 
Most underpayments occurred in the off-harvest periods (e.g., September–October and 
March–April), reflecting the income-smoothing problem faced by borrowers during these 
months. However, the drop in the repayment ratio during these months was not very large. In 
contrast, the months of December–January and May–June were associated with higher than 
average repayments. In December, overpayment was recorded on average. This seasonality 
pattern was found in the char, inland, and river basin areas.  
To understand the discipline framework imposed by the MFIs, the aspect of seasonality in 
terms of the number of weekly meetings missed is informative. As shown in Figure 3, borrowers 
tended to miss more weekly payments as they reached the end of the loan cycle, compared with 
at the beginning of the loan collection period. One noteworthy observation is that the ratio of 
missed weeks to the total monthly due weeks was lower in November–December and in May, 
which could be attributed to the paddy harvest cycle, as previously observed. A similar pattern 
and trend are observed for all three regions.  
 
3.2 Impact of Flexibility on Default and Absence in Weekly Meetings  
(1) Econometric Model 
Since our treatment assignment was randomly distributed (see Section 2) to empirically 
complement our discussion of the repayment analysis, we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions to evaluate the impact of various treatments on numerous outcomes. More precisely, 
we estimated 
 
Yh = b0 + b1D1h + b2D2h + b3D3h + uh,                      (3) 
 
where Yh is the outcome variable for household h, Djh (j = 1, 2, 3) is a dummy variable 
indicating that household h was provided flexible microcredit under treatment arm j (j = 1, 2, 3; 
i.e., Flexible 1, Flexible 1 + IGA, and Flexible 2, respectively), and uh is a zero mean error term. 
Equation (3) was applied to all non-attrited borrowers in the sample so that the number of 
observations totaled 1,068. Because the randomization was implemented at the village level and 
sample households were drawn using the village as the primary sampling unit, we tested the null 
hypothesis using robust standard errors for b's clustered at the village level. 
The coefficient b0 indicates the repayment behavior of control borrowers under the 
traditional, inflexible microcredit scheme. If the null hypothesis b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 is rejected, we 
investigate which flexibility scheme was more effective by comparing the three parameters of b1, 
b2, and b3. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the coefficient b0 indicates the repayment 
behavior of all borrowers on average. Therefore, for convenience, the tables that show 
regression results present the estimate for the intercept in the first row, which is readily 
 
 
interpreted as the estimate for the overall mean if all coefficients on the dummy variables are 
zero. 
 
(2) Regression Results  
Table 3.1 shows the regression results for the microcredit repayment behavior of borrowers 
under the different treatment groups by using indicator variables, namely, the total overdue 
amount, overdue amount as a percentage of total due amount, overdue amount after six months 
of the loan cycle, and overdue amount adjusted with savings after six months of the scheduled 
loan cycle. For each variable, the odd column reports the basic regression results controlling for 
stratification, while the even column reports the results from a specification with additional 
control for household observables. No statistically significant difference exists among the 
treatment groups compared with the control group for “traditional microcredit.” Furthermore, 
Flexible 1 groups show more favorable point estimations than other groups (and all other 
treatment groups in column 5 onwards), albeit this is not statistically significant.  
[Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here] 
To understand the repayment discipline and commitment behavior of various groups, 
Equation (3) was re-estimated using the binary indicator variable of loan discipline, wherein the 
variable takes the value of one for having one missing week and zero otherwise. Table 3.2 
shows that on average, the Control group (traditional, rigid weekly repayment scheme) had 
difficulties with repayment discipline framework, as expected. If we emphasize the number of 
total missed weeks as a percentage of total due weeks (Columns 4−5) and the number of total 
missed weeks (Columns 5–6), our results do not show statistically significant differences among 
treatment groups. This suggests that flexibility of full moratorium during the monga period did 
not result in reducing repayment discipline, thus contradicting the MFIs’ fear. 
Now, we continue our discussion by highlighting the indicator variable default, a dummy 
variable equal to one if a borrower’s due payment at the end of the loan cycle is positive, and 
zero otherwise. As shown in Columns (1)–(2) of Table 3.3, the difference between the groups 
was not statistically significant at any level. The null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 was not 
rejected at the 10% level, indicating that the flexibility in our RCT did not result in higher 
default rate. 
[Table 3.3 about here] 
We found that neither seasonality nor spatial heterogeneity (char, river basin, and inland) 
affected the regression results reported in Columns (1)–(2). The rejection of the null hypothesis 
that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 was found to be robust to other specifications that allow for seasonality or 
spatial heterogeneity. 10  We also examined the same default indicator by employing the 
                                                   
10 The robustness check results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
 
 
repayment adjustment technique used by our partner MFI—adjustment of overdue amount with 
weekly savings amount at the samity, six months after the scheduled loan cycle, as reported in 
Columns (3)–(4). These results are entirely consistent with earlier findings given in Columns 
(1)–(2). In the last two columns of Table 3.3 (Columns 5−6), we estimated the impact of 
flexibility on the total saving amount of the borrowing groups. Flexible 1 borrowers, on average, 
were found to have saved significantly less than the other two groups, which probably indicates 
that Flexible 1 groups invested their credit in investments that did not immediately generate 
sufficient revenue that allowed them to save for the weekly meetings.     
The loan cycle period for experimentation ran from September 2011 to July 2012. 
Unfortunately, in May 2012, our survey area suffered from periodic flash floods, which affected 
most geographical areas. However, the effect was considerably more pronounced in char and 
river basin areas. As a result, flood-affected borrowers might have found it difficult to maintain 
the repayment discipline stipulated by our partner MFI and may have had higher delinquency 
rates, which resulted in no significant differences between the borrowing groups. To check 
whether this is the case, in Table 3.4, we estimated regression with the loan discipline and 
default indicators of our borrowing groups before the occurrence of the floods (up to May 2012 
repayment records). These results are consistent with earlier findings, and we have found no 
statistical difference among the groups and across the estimations.    
[Table 3.4 about here]  
 
During our study period, some samitys resisted the weekly repayment after the monga 
period and forced loan officers to accept monthly repayments after the flexible period, rather 
than weekly repayments as designed. Flexible 2 groups were found to have engaged in more 
systematic resistance than other groups, perhaps owing to their behavioral adjustment to 
monthly repayment during the monga.  
 
 (3) Subjective Evaluation of Flexible Microcredit by Borrowers 
To understand borrowers’ reactions to the current repayment flexibility experiment as well 
as their feedback to it, we administered a satisfaction survey, following the work of Devoto et al. 
(2012), which asked existing clients if they had complaints, problems, or difficulties with the 
assigned schedule of repayment. The survey was conducted as a part of the first monga survey 
(Panel 2) in November 2011. In the current study, if the borrower responded positively, we 
categorized the answer as “satisfied” in the satisfaction index, and as zero otherwise. 
Table 4 presents the regression result based on Equation (3). It clearly shows that 
borrowers under the Flexible 1 repayment scheme (complete moratorium of repayment during 
monga) were more likely to report positive satisfaction. Among the treatment arms, Flexible 1 
 
 
had a higher level of satisfaction than the other groups, and this finding is consistent with our 
hypothesis. We conjecture that this satisfaction led borrowers to maintain discipline in 
repayment under flexible schemes.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.3 Summary and Discussion 
In this section, we empirically analyzed repayment behavior among borrowers with access 
to various microcredit products assigned to them under the RCT-based field experimental 
framework. Using an RCT-based field experiment in northern Bangladesh, we randomly 
assigned seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit and traditional rigid microcredit to various 
borrowing groups. Our results suggest no statistically discernible difference between the 
treatment arms in terms of default or overdue amounts, and these findings thus support the 
provision of flexible microcredit.  
As mentioned in the introduction, our main motivation in introducing seasonality-adjusted 
flexible microcredit was to verify the rationales of MFIs working in northern Bangladesh for not 
providing flexibility in loan repayment during monga. The MFIs’ reluctance is mainly due to 
their fear that such flexibility might break the borrowers’ loan collection discipline, thus 
increasing the rate of loan default. When we introduced this experimental design, GUK, our 
counterpart NGO, strongly argued that the loan default rate would significantly increase in the 
moratorium group (Flexible 1): they thought that it would hamper loan discipline as well as 
affect financial behavior vis-à-vis the making of regular repayments. Some GUK executives 
also said that loan borrowers from the moratorium group might “run away” with the money. Our 
regression results clearly show that this fear is baseless. In contrast with the claims of 
Bangladeshi MFIs, we saw no statistically significant difference between treatment arms in 
terms of seasonality-adjusted flexible microcredit. For the treatment arm featuring a complete 
moratorium of weekly repayments (high-risk credit) and a change from weekly to monthly 
repayments during monga (low-risk credit), we found that borrowers did not show a statistically 
significant pattern of delinquency or lower frequency of repayments. Thus, these results do not 
uphold the MFIs’ claims that such flexibility would lead to i) discipline problems or ii) 
repayment problems. It appears that even when imposing a high level of credit risk (Flexible 1) 
on our counterpart MFI, GUK did not face a level of delinquency statistically different from that 
seen among traditional groups (delinquency rates were 3.77 and 3.75% of the total due amount 
in the cases of traditional and Flexible 1 borrowing, respectively). In other words, even after 
allowing a moratorium during monga, we found that our counterpart NGO regained more than 
95% of its targeted amount of credit with interest, meaning that this can be considered a 
 
 
successful microfinance business model. 
 
4. Impact of Flexibility on Household Consumption 
In this section, we examine whether seasonal adjustment in microcredit affects food 
consumption levels of borrower households. Through this examination, we assess the welfare 
impact of a moratorium or less frequent repayment meetings during monga.  
 
4.1 Data on Household Food Consumption 
For the impact analysis regarding consumption, we use microdata collected in the resurvey 
(Panel 3, July–August 2012) and the second monga survey (Panel 4, November–December 
2012) of the 1,422 households. Table 5 describes the qualitative measures of food 
consumption. 11  During monga 2011, 12  many households were not able to have three 
stomach-full meals each day. The average number of num_mong1 was 2.1 meals per day, and 
this became as low as 1.67 meals if we focus on the worst days during monga (variable named 
num_mong2). A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a household could afford two or 
three meals per day, even during the worst period, is used as a measure of food safety (denoted 
as safe_mong in the table). Using this measure, 66% of the households were food secure during 
monga 2011. As other measures of food security, we analyze dummy variables for fish and meat 
consumption within a typical week during monga 2011 (denoted as fish_mong and meat_mong, 
respectively), indicating that 73% of sample households were able to eat some fish and hardly 
anyone could manage to consume meat during the monga of 2011.13  
As shown in the middle panel of Table 5, food consumption situations recovered 
substantially after monga. The average number of stomach-full meals in a day during the normal, 
non-monga time in 2012 (num_norm1) was 2.85 meals a day; this number dropped slightly to 
2.12 if we focus on the worst days during the same period (num_norm2). Using safe_norm, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a household could afford two or three meals per 
day, even during the worst period, 88% of the households were food secure during normal 
non-monga times in 2012.  
The last panel of Table 5 shows food consumption situations during monga 2012. 
Households again suffered from consumption irregularities, as in monga 2011, with the average 
                                                   
11 Quantitative information on household consumption—such as total expenditure, including the imputed 
value of self-produced foods—is not available in our data set. 
12 Information on food consumption during monga 2011 was collected in the Panel 3 survey, which 
covered the entire monga period; this information, therefore, is not the same as that on food consumption, 
which was collected during monga 2011, i.e., in the Panel 2 survey in November 2011. The results 
reported in this paper remain qualitatively the same if we use the Panel 2 survey data instead. 
13 In the questionnaire, we also inquired about fish consumption. The absolute majority of sample 
households were able to eat fish in a month, even during monga. Given this lack of variation, we used 
meat as a measure of protein security. 
 
 
number of monga_foodHH dropping to 2.08 meals per day, and becoming even lower at 1.35 
meals if we focus on the worst days during monga 2012 (variable named minimum_monga). 
When surveyed again in 2012, one year after the initial intervention, 70% of the respondents 
reported that they suffered from food shortage during the monga.  
Similar to the case for repayment behavior, food consumption variables are systematically 
correlated with geographical categories: char, inland, and river basin. Inland households had the 
highest mean for all six variables. This is as expected as households in inland areas away from 
rivers have better access to food markets than do households in char areas or close to rivers. 
Against our expectation, char households had higher means for five variables compared with 
river basin households, although the difference was small.  
 
4.2 Impact of Flexibility on Household Food Consumption 
(1) Econometric Model  
Because the intervention was randomly assigned (see Section 2), to evaluate the impact on 
food consumption, we simply regressed the Panel 3 outcomes on the dummy variables for 
various treatments. More precisely, we estimated 
 
Yh = b0 + b1D1h + b2D2h + b3D3h + b4D4h + uh,                (4) 
 
where Yh is a post-intervention outcome variable for household h, Djh (j = 1, 2, 3) is a dummy 
variable indicating that household h was provided with flexible microcredit under treatment arm 
j (j = 1, 2, 3; i.e., Flexible 1, Flexible 1 + IGA, and Flexible 2, respectively), D4h is a dummy for 
nonborrower households, and uh is a zero mean error term. If the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 = 
b3 = 0 is not rejected, it indicates that the flexibility within our RCT had no impact. If this null 
hypothesis is not rejected while another null hypothesis that b4 = 0 is rejected, it indicates that 
microcredit provision had an impact, regardless of flexibility. If the null hypothesis that b1 = b2 
= b3 = 0 is rejected, we investigate which flexibility scheme was more effective by comparing 
the three parameters of b1, b2, and b3. Because the randomization was implemented at the village 
level, and sample households were drawn using the village as a primary sampling unit, we test 
the null hypothesis using robust standard errors for b’s clustered at the village level. 
Although randomization is likely to result in treatment and control households being 
similar across all variables, minor baseline differences can occur within a particular sample (see 
Appendix Tables 1–2). To address this, we added to Equation (4) a control for baseline variables 
associated with significant differences across treatment arms. We report on this as a robustness 
check. Other specifications using changes in outcomes between Panels 3 and 1 as dependent 
variables are left for future research. 
 
 
As additional robustness checks, we estimated two further models. In the first, the last term 
in Equation (4), b4D4h, was allowed to have various slopes, depending on the village-level 
treatment type. If spillover effects from borrower to nonborrower households exist within a 
samity, and if such spillover effects possess systematic differences depending on the treatment 
arm assigned to the samity, nonborrower households could be heterogeneous across the 
village-level treatment arms. The extended model can accommodate this possibility. In the 
second model, we dropped the last term in Equation (4), b4D4h, and estimated the contracted 
model using only data on borrower households. 
 
(2) Expected Signs of Parameter Estimates 
To examine the impact of repayment flexibility on food consumption, we estimated 
Equation (4) using each variable listed in Table 5, as dependent variables. Theoretically, the 
impact of repayment flexibility on food consumption is indirect. Flexibility does not directly 
affect the ways in which households choose consumption. On the other hand, it indirectly 
affects consumption through income, price, and credit constraint effects.  
We begin the discussion with the likely sign of b4. We expect it to be negative, i.e., we 
expect that provision of microcredit increases food consumption. The first channel is the income 
effect. If microcredit enhances permanent household income by allowing households to allocate 
resources more efficiently, the resulting income increases should be reflected in higher levels of 
food consumption. This route should apply to each of the six dependent variables. The second 
channel is the price effect. If microcredit enhances the productivity of self-employment 
businesses and if labor market are imperfect, the shadow price of family labor should increase, 
which is likely to lead to more household resources being allocated to food (as the major input 
to human capital). However, an increase in the shadow wage might work in the opposite 
direction with regard to food consumption demand. Theoretically, the net impact can be either 
positive or negative, but in either case, the absolute value of the net impact is not likely to be 
large. The third channel is the credit constraint effect. By definition, the provision of microcredit 
to a household enhances its ability to smooth resource allocation across time. Since households 
anticipate monga suffering, reducing food consumption during monga might be a symptom of a 
binding liquidity constraint. If this is the case, we expect b4 to be more negative when the 
dependent variables are food consumption during monga than during the normal time following 
monga.  
If the flexibility arrangements examined in our experiments have similar magnitudes of 
income, price, and credit effects, we expect b1, b2, and b3 to be zero. Alternatively, if Flexible 1 
+ IGA makes it more likely for borrower households to engage in self-employment businesses 
that yield immediate gains, then the income and price effects are likely to be larger for this 
 
 
treatment than for others. If this is the case, we expect b2 to be positive and larger than either b1 
or b3. Regarding the liquidity effect, we expect Flexible 1 and Flexible 1 + IGA to have 
additional gains over Flexible 2, and for Flexible 2 to have additional gains over Control. This is 
because the repayment moratorium gives households greater freedom to allocate money across 
the 60 days of monga than does the inflexible, traditional microcredit scheme. Similarly, 
monthly repayments give households more freedom to allocate money across 30 days in a 
month during monga than does traditional microcredit. If this is the case, we expect b1 = b2 > b3 
> 0. 
 
(3) Regression Results Using Panel 3 Data 
The results regarding the impact of our RCT on food consumption using Panel 3 data on 
food consumption during the monga of 2011 are reported in Table 6. Regarding stomach-full 
meal consumption during monga 2011, as reported in Columns (1)-(2), the null hypothesis that 
b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 was rejected at the 10% level. However, for the other consumption variables 
used for understanding the food intake behavior, as reported in Columns (3)-(10), the null 
hypothesis was not rejected. This indicates that the flexibility in our RCT had no impact on 
household-level food consumption behavior during monga 2011, expect for the in-kind full 
moratorium treatment group (Flexible 1+IGA). Examining individual parameters, none are 
statistically significant if we use the traditional cut-off threshold at the 5% level. In the equation 
for num_mong1 (number of stomach-full meals per day during monga), parameter b2 (the 
impact of Flexible 1 + IGA) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
estimated parameter suggests that such borrowers were 19.1 percentage points more likely to 
have one more stomach-full meal during the monga of 2011.  
[Table 6 and 7 about here] 
Parameter b4 was estimated with a negative sign (as expected) in all of the equations, 
but its absolute value was small; it was also statistically insignificant in all four equations if we 
use the traditional cut-off threshold at the 5% level. The results regarding the impact of our RCT 
on food consumption during normal, non-monga times in 2012 are reported in Table 7. When 
the number of stomach-full meals (num_norm1) and minimum stomach-full meals per day 
during these times (num_norm2) was used as dependent variables, all coefficients on the four 
dummy variables were small in terms of absolute values, however, the coefficient of Flexible 1 
and Flexible 2 showed weak evidence of reduced meal consumption (Columns 1-2). On the 
other hand, when the same variable was transformed into a dummy for food safety during 
normal times (safe_norm), none of the treatment variables showed significance even at the 10% 
level. We further used indicator variables for meat and fish consumption during the normal 
period (meat_norm and fish_norm, respectively), reported in Columns (7)-(10), which clearly 
 
 
shows that microcredit improves the food intake and protein intakes of the borrower households, 
however, the variation of different repayment schedules adjusted for lean period, were not 
particularly influential in improving the food intake during the non-lean periods.     
The results reported in Table 6 and 7 were robustly found from other specifications.14 We 
tried (i) extending model (4) with baseline village and household attributes as additional 
explanatory variables; (ii) extending the last term in Equation (4), b4D4h, to have different slopes 
depending on treatment arm; (iii) re-estimating Equation (4) without the last term while using 
only borrower households; and (iv) using the limited dependent variable models, considering 
the truncation or integer nature of the dependent variables. The robustness check results, though 
not reported, were also found to be qualitatively similar with our findings. 
  
(4) Regression Results using Panel 4 Data 
Regression results using Panel 4 data were more favorable for the flexible microcredit 
scheme. In other words, after a year of initial intervention, we saw positive changes in food 
intake during the lean season. Tables 8−9 show the regression results regarding food 
consumption during monga 2012. In these tables, we report two sets of regression results for 
each of the seven variables listed in Table 5 (last panel) as dependent variables. For each 
variable, the odd column reports the basic regression results controlling for stratification, while 
the even column reports the results from a specification with additional control for household 
observables.  
Overall, the impact of microcredit has been positive on food consumption. Columns (1)–
(2) of Table 8 show that the number of stomach-full meals consumed during monga 2012 
increased for all treatment groups. However, the impact is considerably more pronounced for 
Flexible 1 + IGA group and Flexible 2 groups compared with for other treatment groups. 
Similarly, Columns (3)–(4) of Table 8 indicate strong positive impacts for Flexible 1 + IGA 
group, as this group consumed about 32% more stomach-full meals on the worst day of monga 
2012, followed by Flexible 2 group (about 15%). In Columns (5)–(6) of Table 8, the estimated 
parameter suggests that Flexible 1 + IGA and Flexible 2 borrowers were about 39 and 19 
percentage points, respectively, less likely to be food insecure, versus the sample average of 70 
percentage points.    
              
 [Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
 
We further inquired about this pattern of improvement of food consumption to learn more 
about improvement in overall protein consumption during monga 2012. To explore this, we 
                                                   
14 The robustness check results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
 
 
collected information on protein intake in terms of meat (chicken, lamb, or beef) and fish 
consumption at dinner during a typical monga week. The result of such estimations are depicted 
in Table 9, which clearly shows that in the category of protein, fish consumption among the 
treatment groups (Columns 7–8) substantially increased, with Flexible 1 + IGA borrowers 
significantly improving their fish consumption during monga 2012, followed by the other two 
treatment groups. Columns (5)-(6) of Table 9 show that parameter b4 is negative (marginally 
significant at the 10% level), indicating that any type of microcredit is useful in securing higher 
protein consumption of fish. Regarding meat consumption (Column 1-4, Table 9), parameter b4 
is negative, followed by traditional microcredit, which tend to indicate that the flexible nature of 
repayment may be influential to consume more protein in the form of meat during monga 2012, 
however, such findings are not statistically significant.     
These results indicate that after a year of initial intervention, there were some positive 
changes in the food intake during the lean season among the treatment groups. We also see that 
Flexible 1 + IGA borrowers have more successfully translated their credit into better welfare 
outcomes, when measured through food consumption behavior during the lean season. This is 
consistent with our previous finding of increased meal intakes by Flexible 1 + IGA borrowers 
during monga 2011. These results might indicate that in-kind seasonal moratorium credit might 
be useful for the borrowers to achieve welfare improvements due to the “Flypaper” effect where 
“capital coming directly to the business sticks there but cash does not” (Fafchamps at el., 2014, 
page 1). Flexible 2 borrowers also showed some indication of improvements in food 
consumption; however, these improvements are marginal and, in most cases, weakly significant. 
However, Flexible 1 groups showed hardly any improvements in food consumption compared 
with the control group. One explanation could be that most Flexible 1 group members spend 
their credit on ambitious business projects owing to no immediate pressure for repayment. 
These businesses probably do not generate sufficient income in the short-run. As a result, during 
monga 2011 and 2012, we do not see any significant impact of Flexible 1 on food consumption. 
Another explanation of these findings could indicate the issue of self-control problem, as more 
restricted credits, Flexible 1 + IGA and Flexible 2, perhaps created more revenue and profit, 
which resulted in welfare improvements, however, less restrictive ones (Flexible 1) might have 
ended up in bad investment or non-productive activities, which has failed to generate any 
improvement in welfare.       
 
4.3 Summary and Discussion 
This section empirically assesses whether a flexible repayment design for microcredit can 
enhance food consumption among the ultrapoor. We used two rounds of cross-sectional data sets 
from northern Bangladesh collected in 2012, after an RCT was implemented in 2011-12. We 
 
 
found that, except for in-kind seasonal moratorium credit, repayment flexibility to have no 
immediate positive impact on food consumption during the intervention as well as during the 
normal period after the intervention. During the year-long intervention period, all microcredit 
borrowers tended to have more secure food consumption than did nonborrowers, although the 
difference was marginal. After a year of initial intervention, the impact became larger and a 
difference started to appear between the treatment groups and the control group.  
In the context of the current study, we can suggest several possible explanations for the 
insignificance of the flexibility impact until mid-2012. First, if the reduction of liquidity 
constraints is the main route through which the provision of microcredit enhances consumption, 
our finding is consistent with the view that the main problem for the ultrapoor is consumption 
smoothing between the monga and non-monga seasons, as they were already able to smooth 
consumption within these seasons in the absence of microcredit. If this is the case—and if 
income and price effects are negligible—there should be no difference across microcredit types; 
however, nonborrowers’ consumption should be smaller than that of borrowers. Our empirical 
results broadly support this pattern. Second, the insignificance of the repayment flexibility 
impact could be due to the insignificant difference in income changes across the four credit 
schemes studied. This was likely when the borrowed money was invested in a business that did 
not generate immediate income gains.  
Our finding of a positive impact using the Round 4 data, especially among Flexible 1 + 
IGA borrowers, confirms the above speculation. Under the context of this study, wherein poor 
borrowers do not have sufficient entrepreneurship ability, Flexible 1 + IGA has higher potential 
to raise borrowers’ income levels. During monga 2012, perhaps the higher income generated 
from IGA enabled borrowers to increase their consumption to a greater extent than other 
borrowers. Furthermore, during monga 2012, protein consumption was more secure among 
microcredit borrowers of any type than among nonborrowers, consistent with the findings of 
monga 2011. This indicates a continuation of difficulties faced by the ultrapoor in char and 
river-basin areas with regard to smoothing consumption between monga and non-monga 
seasons. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we empirically examine whether flexible microcredit leads to an increase in 
repayment problems for MFIs and whether it can increase and stabilize consumption of 
borrower households. The empirical analysis is based on data collected through a randomized 
controlled trial in 2011−12 in northern Bangladesh. Our results suggest no statistically 
discernible difference between treatment arms in terms of default and overdue amounts, thus 
supporting flexible microcredit. However, in terms of loan discipline, Flexible 2 groups 
 
 
exhibited resistance for monthly repayment after the end of the designated monga period for 
repayment adjustment. This is an important lesson for designing seasonality-adjusted flexible 
microcredit; perhaps implementing a similar repayment pattern throughout the loan cycle with 
flexibility during the period of seasonality is preferable to mixing different repayment patterns 
during the course of the loan cycle.     
On the other hand, we find that it took time for such seasonality-adjusted flexible 
microcredit to impact food consumption. Except for in-kind seasonal moratorium credit, hardly 
any positive impact of repayment flexibility on immediate food consumption was found during 
the period of seasonality. After a year of initial intervention, however, we saw positive changes 
in food intake during the lean season. All microcredit borrowers tended to have more secure 
food consumption than did nonborrowers. This could be due to the possibility that the main 
problem for the ultrapoor is consumption smoothing between the lean and non-lean seasons as 
well as the time required to realize income changes induced by credit schemes or due to 
self-control problem as the least restricted seasonal adjusted microcredit performed badly 
among the treatment groups. The findings of this study will help MFIs optimize their credit 
schemes. In addition, they could help other interested parties, including government institutions, 
advocate a relaxation of microcredit rules or seek alternative policy instruments. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of Interventions and Surveys 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. The blue panels show events regarding interventions, and the green 
panels show events regarding surveys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline survey (Panel 1)  
[July–Sept. 2011] 
Provision of microcredit and the start of weekly 
repayment [Sept. 2011] 
Start of the repayment flexibility RCT during 
Monga  [Sept. 20, 2011] 
First Monga survey (Panel 2) 
[Nov. 2011] 
End of the repayment flexibility RCT during Monga 
[Dec. 20, 2011] 
Follow-up survey (Panel 3) 
[July–Aug. 2012] 
End of repayment [Aug.–Sept. 2012] 
Second Monga survey (Panel 
4) [Nov.–Dec. 2012] 
 
 
Figure 2: Differences in Repayment Patterns across Three Geographic Areas 
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Figure 3: Seasonality of Repayment Behavior 
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Ratio of monthly collection to the month's due amount
Ratio of missed weeks to total weeks due in the month
Control Flexible 1 Flexible 1 + IGA Flexible 2
Number of villages 12 24 12 24 72
By district
Gaibandha District 9 16 8 12 45
Kurigram District 3 8 4 12 27
By location type
Char 3 6 3 6 18
Inland areas 7 14 7 14 42
River-basin 2 4 2 4 12
Borrower 180 360 180 360 1,080
Nonborrower 60 120 60 120 360
Total 240 480 240 480 1,440
Borrower 180 356 176 356 1,068
Nonborrower 60 117 59 118 354
Total 240 473 235 474 1,422
Table 1: Distribution of Sample Villages and Households by Treatment Type, 
Northern Bangladesh, 2011–12
Source : Compiled by the authors.
TotalTreatment Allocation at the Village Level
Number of households in the beseline survey and first Monga survey, 2011 (Panel 1 and Panel 2)
Number of households in the follow-up survey and second monga survey, 2012 (Panels 3 and 4)
Variable Definition N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overdue at the end of a loan cycle
default Dummy for default (1 if the due amount is positive at the end of a loan cycle) 1,080 0.73 0.444 0 1.00
overdue Amount due  at the end of a loan cycle (in BDT) 1,080 556.14 605.0 0 3210.00
loverdue Log of amount due at the end of a loan cycle (in BDT) 1,080 4.66 2.9 0 8.10
roverdue Amount due as a percentage of total due amount 1,080 0.17 0.2 0 0.98
due_ledger_closing Due amount after six months of the loan cycle 1,080 159.64 501.9 0 3210.00
ledgerclosing_adjusted Due amount adjusted with savings, after six months of scheduled loan cycle 1,080 114.81 423.4 0 2990.00
Overdue before the flood in June
cummaydue Cumulative due up to June 1,080 276.25 397.0 0 2550.00
lcummaydue Log of cumulative due up to June 1,080 3.85 2.7 0 7.85
Number of weekly repayments missed
weeksdeafult Total number of missed weeks 1,080 5.92 6.601 0 41.00
lmiss Log of total number of missed weeks 1,080 1.53 0.924 0 3.74
evermiss Dummy variable weeks default (1 if at least one week missed of the required due) 1,080 0.86 0.345 0 1.00
rmiss Number of missed weeks as a percentage of total due weeks 1,080 0.18 0.185 0 1.00
Number of weekly repayments missed before the flood in June
cummaymiss Total number of missed weeks up to June 1,080 3.13 4.530 0 34.00
lmissmay Log of total number of missed weeks up to June 1,080 0.99 0.880 0 3.56
evermiss_may Dummy variable weeks default (1 if atleast missed one week of the required due) 1,080 0.69 0.462 0 1.00
rmissmay Number of missed weeks as a percentage of total due weeks up to June 1,080 0.13 0.180 0 1.00
Note: Mean and standard deviations are simple ones, without weighting. 
Source: Compiled by the authors using the administrative information for borrowers.
Table 2: Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables Related to Repayment Behavior, Northern Bangladesh, 2011–12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Overdue 
amount at the 
end of a loan 
cycle (in 
BDT)
Overdue 
amount at 
the end of a 
loan cycle 
(in BDT)
Overdue as a 
percentage of 
total due 
amount 
Overdue as a 
percentage of 
Total due 
amount 
Overdue 
amount after 
six months of 
the loan cycle
Overdue 
amount after 
6 months of 
the loan cycle
Overdue 
adjusted with 
savings after 
six months of 
scheduled 
loan cycle
Overdue 
adjusted with 
the savings, 
after six 
months of 
schedule loan 
cycle
Constant 447.710** 830.933** 0.133** 0.247** 221.207 425.394 161.075 339.946
(197.112) (317.783) (0.059) (0.095) (145.698) (262.450) (130.276) (230.150)
Flexible 1 -40.702 -30.890 -0.012 -0.009 -107.750 -109.641 -77.289 -77.753
(185.022) (185.843) (0.055) (0.055) (130.170) (130.300) (116.028) (116.694)
Flexible 1+ IGA 64.294 69.836 0.019 0.021 -21.244 -21.767 -5.407 -5.200
(228.326) (228.633) (0.068) (0.068) (165.169) (164.333) (141.985) (141.566)
Flexible 2 71.686 78.982 0.021 0.024 -51.774 -54.974 -30.399 -32.392
(202.217) (202.717) (0.060) (0.060) (134.202) (133.503) (118.207) (118.419)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 556.14 556.14 0.16 0.16 141.57 141.57 99.32 99.32
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
R-squared 0.044 0.052 0.044 0.052 0.082 0.089 0.054 0.061
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.51
F-stat 1.056 2.231 1.056 2.231 1.833 1.266 1.467 0.991
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household 
Chracterestics include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in 
households and total land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 3.1: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Repayment Behavior (Indicators for Overdue Amount)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Indicator for 
having at least 
one missed 
week
Indicator for 
having atleast 
one missed week
Missed weeks as a 
percentage of total 
due weeks
Missed weeks as a 
percentage of total 
due weeks
No. of missed 
weeks
No. of missed 
weeks
Constant 0.733*** 0.702*** 0.148*** 0.226** 7.019*** 10.297***
(0.081) (0.147) (0.051) (0.089) (2.361) (3.295)
Flexible 1 0.105 0.106 0.034 0.035 -0.307 -0.281
(0.090) (0.090) (0.051) (0.051) (2.252) (2.266)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.110 0.104 -0.011 -0.010 -2.598 -2.604
(0.088) (0.086) (0.053) (0.053) (2.155) (2.160)
Flexible 2 0.144 0.144 0.052 0.052 -0.257 -0.279
(0.094) (0.094) (0.054) (0.055) (2.292) (2.302)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.86 0.86 0.17 0.17 5.77 5.77
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
R-squared 0.068 0.077 0.112 0.118 0.140 0.147
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.79 0.8 1.02 1.01 2.08 2.09
F-stat 2.593 1.910 3.745 2.780 5.293 3.196
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household 
Chracterestics include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of 
adults in households and total land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 3.2: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Repayment Behavior (Repayment Discipline Indicators)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Binary Default (if 
total due amount 
at the end of loan 
cycle > 0)
Binary Default 
(if total due 
amount at the 
end of loan cycle 
> 0)
Binary Default (if 
total due adjusted 
six months after 
the loan cycle 
with savings 
amount > 0)
Binary Default (if 
total due adjusted 6 
month after the loan 
cycle with savings 
amount > 0)
Total Savings Total Savings
Constant 0.490*** 0.637*** 0.257** 0.455* 527.212*** 566.785***
(0.108) (0.209) (0.122) (0.256) (45.168) (93.693)
Flexible 1 0.013 0.017 0.094 0.104 -93.569** -92.460*
(0.111) (0.112) (0.134) (0.133) (46.807) (47.115)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.049 0.051 0.034 0.042 -87.268 -86.715
(0.139) (0.139) (0.158) (0.157) (66.252) (65.928)
Flexible 2 0.042 0.047 0.139 0.150 -30.695 -28.698
(0.116) (0.117) (0.141) (0.141) (55.785) (55.803)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.73 0.73 0.48 0.48 433.51 433.51
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068
R-squared 0.239 0.242 0.112 0.127 0.181 0.189
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.08 0.08 0.44 0.5 1.82 1.82
F-stat 7.358 3.638 2.422 4.800 5.990 3.894
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 3.3: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Repayment Behavior (Default Indicators)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household 
Chracterestics include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults 
in households and total land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Overdue 
amount up 
to May (in 
BDT)
Overdue 
amount 
upto May 
(in BDT)
Overdue as a 
percentage of 
total due 
amount (up 
to May) 
Overdue as a 
percentage of 
total due 
amount (upto 
May) 
No. of missed 
weeks up to 
May
No. of missed 
weeks upto 
May
Indicator for 
having at least 
one missed 
week up to 
May
Indicator for 
having atleast 
one missed 
week upto 
May
Constant 352.188** 495.447** 0.105** 0.147** 4.665** 6.571*** 0.639*** 0.526**
-143.875 -205.383 -0.043 -0.061 -1.897 -2.368 -0.108 -0.235
Flexible 1 -25.631 -25.339 -0.008 -0.008 -0.923 -0.921 0.11 0.107
-132.79 -132.21 -0.04 -0.039 -1.752 -1.744 -0.118 -0.116
Flexible 1+ IGA -89.804 -93.344 -0.027 -0.028 -2.063 -2.105 0.015 0.01
-130.224 -129.892 -0.039 -0.039 -1.671 -1.665 -0.143 -0.143
Flexible 2 28.532 26.557 0.008 0.008 -0.66 -0.691 0.191 0.187
-141.267 -140.278 -0.042 -0.042 -1.744 -1.736 -0.121 -0.12
Mean of the Dependent Variable 267.40 267.40 0.08 0.08 3.04 3.04 0.69 0.69
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068
R-squared 0.121 0.132 0.121 0.132 0.135 0.147 0.114 0.118
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.89 1.89 1.4 1.37
F-stat 3.365 2.201 3.365 2.201 4.966 2.992 3.491 2.189
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 3.4: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Repayment Behavior (Various Indicators up to the Flood, May 2012)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household 
Chracterestics include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in 
households and total land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Indicator variable, 
indicating borrower is 
satisfied with the credit 
repayment scheme
Indicator variable, 
indicating borrower is 
satisfied with the credit 
repayment scheme
Indicator variable, 
indicating borrower is 
satisfied with the credit 
repayment scheme
Constant 0.450*** 0.458*** 0.147
(0.102) (0.100) (0.234)
Flexible 1 0.339*** 0.338*** 0.334***
(0.116) (0.109) (0.105)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.226 0.178 0.169
(0.139) (0.136) (0.135)
Flexible 2 0.179 0.135 0.135
(0.127) (0.121) (0.118)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.66 0.66 0.66
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068
R-squared 0.060 0.134 0.158
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 3.10** 4.12*** 4.46***
F-stat 3.100 4.060 3.651
Control of Stratification No Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Month No Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No No Yes
Table 4: Regression Result for Satisfaction Survey, Panel 2 (2011)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), 
and 1% (***) levels. Household Chracterestics include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification 
of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in households and total land holdings. We 
dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 5: Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables Related to Food Consumption, Northern Bangladesh, 2011–12
Variable Definition N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
num_mong1 Number of stomach-full meals in a day during monga 2011 1,422 2.11 0.42 1 3
num_mong2 Number of minimum stomach-full meals a day during monga 2011 1,422 1.67 0.49 1 3
safe_mong Dummy for food safety during monga 2011 (defined as num_mong2  = 2 or 3) 1,422 0.66 0.47 0 1
fish_mong Dummy for having fish within a typical week during monga 2011 1,422 0.73 0.44 0 1
meat_mong Dummy for having meat within a typical week during monga  2011 1,422 0.00 0.04 0 1
num_norm1 Number of stomach-full meals in a day during normal time in 2012 1,422 2.85 0.39 1 3
num_norm2 Number of minimum stomach-full meals a day during normal time in 2012 1,422 2.12 0.59 1 3
safe_norm Dummy for food safety during normal time in 2012 (defined as num_norm2  = 2 or 3) 1,422 0.88 0.33 0 1
fish_norm Dummy for having fish within a typical week during normal time in 2012 1,422 0.02 0.13 0 1
meat_norm Dummy for having meat within a typical week during normal time in 2012 1,422 0.98 0.13 0 1
monga_foodHH Number of Stomack full meals during the Monga 2012 1,422 2.08 0.43 1 3
minimum_monga Number of Minimum Stomack full meals during the Monga 2012 1,422 1.35 0.50 1 3
foodshortage Dummy for Foood Shortage: Household suffering from food shortage during the monga of 2012 1,422 0.70 0.46 0 1
meat_monga Dummy for having meat (chicken, beef or lamb) during a typical week in the Monga 2012 1,422 0.00 0.04 0 1
nmeat_monga No. of times dinner contains meat (chicken, beef, or lamb) in a typical week during monga  2012 1,422 0.00 0.04 0 1
fish_monga Dummy for having fish during a typical week in the Monga 2012 1,422 0.71 0.46 0 1
nfish_monga No. of times dinner contains fish in a typical week during monga 2012 1,422 0.96 0.90 0 7
Note: Mean and standard deviations are simple ones, without weighting. The question of "Number of (minimum) stomach-full meals in a day" was asked to 
respondents who had reported a typical number; thus, the answer took an integer value of either 1, 2, or 3.
Source: Compiled by the authors using the 2012 resurvey data (Panel 3) and 2012 monga survey (Panel 4)
Food consumption during monga  2011
Food consumption during normal times in 2012
Food consumption during monga in 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES num_mong1 num_mong1 num_mong2 num_mong2 safe_mong safe_mong meat_mong meat_mong fish_mong fish_mong
Constant 2.122*** 1.949*** 1.766*** 1.692*** 0.745*** 0.672*** 0.002 0.012 0.801*** 0.661***
(0.046) (0.138) (0.081) (0.183) (0.082) (0.177) (0.002) (0.011) (0.053) (0.173)
Flexible 1 0.030 0.025 0.041 0.037 0.046 0.041 0.000 0.001 -0.066 -0.074
(0.059) (0.060) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.001) (0.001) (0.068) (0.067)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.191** 0.184** 0.054 0.044 0.052 0.043 0.006 0.006 -0.085 -0.092
(0.079) (0.079) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.005) (0.005) (0.096) (0.094)
Flexible 2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.042 -0.046 -0.046 -0.051 0.003 0.004 -0.077 -0.085
(0.053) (0.054) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.003) (0.003) (0.070) (0.069)
Non-Borrower -0.031 -0.040 -0.042 -0.040 -0.036 -0.034 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.025) (0.024) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036) (0.037)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 2.10 2.10 1.66 1.66 0.66 0.66 0.53 0.53 0.73 0.73
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.040 0.075 0.039 0.054 0.038 0.052 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.020
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 2.39* 2.29* 0.93 0.91 1.13 1.14 0.76 0.74 0.48 0.61
F-stat 1.776 3.43 2.118 2.296 1.979 2.044 0.262 0.181 0.410 5.612
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 6: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Food Consumption, monga 2011 (Panel 3)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household Chracterestics include age, 
age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in households and total land holdings. We dropped 
those observations that are attrited. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES num_norm1 num_norm1 num_norm2 num_norm2 safe_norm safe_norm meat_norm meat_norm fish_norm fish_norm
Constant 2.943*** 2.509*** 2.218*** 1.818*** 0.948*** 0.806*** 0.024** 0.010 0.970*** 0.998***
(0.030) (0.171) (0.059) (0.210) (0.036) (0.131) (0.011) (0.055) (0.013) (0.035)
Flexible 1 -0.063* -0.070* -0.033 -0.043 -0.036 -0.041 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.009
(0.036) (0.036) (0.080) (0.080) (0.043) (0.042) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Flexible 1+ IGA -0.011 -0.020 0.069 0.052 0.044 0.035 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002
(0.045) (0.046) (0.074) (0.073) (0.042) (0.040) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Flexible 2 -0.069* -0.076* -0.013 -0.019 -0.050 -0.055 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.009
(0.040) (0.038) (0.074) (0.075) (0.042) (0.040) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Non-Borrower -0.025 -0.022 0.018 0.017 -0.020 -0.015 0.003 0.004 -0.012 -0.013
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 2.84 2.84 2.12 2.12 0.66 0.66 0.87 0.87 0.02 0.02
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.020 0.039 0.052 0.087 0.035 0.056 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.017
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 1.51 1.88 0.95 0.76 1.13 1.14 2.25* 2.06 0.89 0.90
F-stat 2.124 2.689 3.876 3.856 3.723 3.715 1.178 1.488 1.866 1.254
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 7: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Food Consumption, Normal times in 2012 (Panel 3)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household Chracterestics include age, age 
squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in households and total land holdings. We dropped those 
observations that are attrited. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Number of 
stomach-full 
meals during 
monga 2012
Number of 
Stomack full 
meals during 
the Monga 
2012
Number of 
minimum 
stomach-full 
meals during 
monga 2012
Number of 
Minimum 
Stomack full 
meals during the 
Monga 2012
Dummy for food 
shortage: Is this 
household 
suffering from 
food shortage 
during monga 
2012?
Dummy for 
Foood Shortage: 
Is this Household 
sufferin from food 
shortage during 
monga 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.077*** 2.084*** 1.254*** 1.319*** 0.754*** 0.930***
(0.061) (0.140) (0.085) (0.189) (0.075) (0.165)
Flexible 1 0.122 0.123 0.141 0.146 -0.154* -0.155*
(0.078) (0.078) (0.106) (0.104) (0.091) (0.087)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.274** 0.273** 0.315*** 0.313*** -0.386*** -0.378***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.115) (0.114) (0.109) (0.107)
Flexible 2 0.146* 0.146* 0.149 0.155 -0.186* -0.190**
(0.080) (0.080) (0.110) (0.109) (0.095) (0.091)
Non-Borrower -0.047 -0.048 0.029 0.029 0.009 0.006
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 2.28 2.28 1.35 1.35 0.7 0.7
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.107 0.107 0.128
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 2.29* 2.24* 2.6** 2.58* 4.23*** 4.17***
F-stat 2.233 1.661 5.383 3.867 4.341 4.197
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 8: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Food Consumption during monga  2012
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household Chracterestics 
include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in households and 
total land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Dummy for 
having meat 
(chicken, beef 
or lamb) 
during a 
typical week 
in the Monga 
2012
Dummy for 
having meat 
(chicken, beef 
or lamb) 
during a 
typical week 
in the Monga 
2013
Number of times 
your dinner 
contains meat 
(chicken, beef, or 
lamb) in a 
typical week 
during monga 
2012
Number of 
times your 
dinner contains 
meat (chicken, 
beef or lamb) 
during a typical 
week in the 
Monga 2012
Dummy for 
having fish 
during a 
typical week 
in the 
Monga 2012
Dummy for 
having fish 
during a 
typical week 
in the Monga 
2013
Number of 
times your 
dinner 
contains fish 
in a typical 
week during 
monga 2012
Number of 
times your 
dinner 
contains fish 
during a 
typical week 
in the Monga 
2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.883*** 0.782*** 1.123*** 1.003***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.044) (0.186) (0.087) (0.289)
Flexible 1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.198 0.192
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.056) (0.056) (0.123) (0.118)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.015 -0.029 0.488** 0.456**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.068) (0.069) (0.208) (0.208)
Flexible 2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.015 0.221* 0.217*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.061) (0.131) (0.126)
Non-Borrower -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.040* -0.042* -0.013 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.055) (0.055)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.71 0.96 0.96
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422
R-squared 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.015 0.242 0.259 0.254 0.285
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.05 0.14 2.46* 2.35*
F-stat 0.305 0.278 0.305 0.278 14.35 13.25 11.34 7.706
Control of Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Credit Distribution Months Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Household Characterestics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Table 9: Impact of Flexible Microcredit on Protein Intake during monga  2012
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Household Chracterestics 
include age, age squared, sex, marital status, education qualification of the household head as well as size of the household, number of adults in households and total 
land holdings. We dropped those observations that are attrited. 
Distance 
from the 
closest bus 
station (km)
Dummy for a 
char  village
Dummy for 
an inland 
village
Bazar College
Mondir 
(Hindu 
temple)
Town Bus stand Railway station
Intercept 32.167*** 0.250* 0.583*** 7.917** 37.083*** 43.333*** 47.917*** 39.583** 76.667***
(10.649) (0.128) (0.146) (3.712) (5.171) (7.197) (5.469) (16.799) (14.891)
Flexible 1 8.875 -0.042 0.042 1.042 -4.583 -6.250 -0.000 21.708 3.333
(13.042) (0.157) (0.179) (4.546) (6.333) (8.815) (6.699) (20.575) (18.238)
Flexible 1+IGA 17.667 0.083 -0.083 4.583 4.167 10.417 11.250 15.833 17.917
(15.060) (0.181) (0.206) (5.249) (7.313) (10.178) (7.735) (23.758) (21.059)
Flexible 2 15.167 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.208 5.625 2.083 4.375 15.625
(13.042) (0.157) (0.179) (4.546) (6.333) (8.815) (6.699) (20.575) (18.238)
R 2 0.020 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.039 0.063 0.045 0.023 0.020
F -stat. for zero slopes of all dummies 0.610 0.210 0.160 0.382 0.923 1.518 1.066 0.544 0.469
Appendix Table 1: Balance Test at the Village Level
Note: The number of observations is 72. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Dependent 
variables for B are measured in minutes if public transportation is used, and the value of zero is assigned when the facility exists in the village.
Source: Estimated by the authors using the benchmark survey data.
A. Dependent variable: Location
(strata used in randomization) B. Dependent variable: Minutes of travel to the nearest facility
Age Dummy for female
Dummy for 
literacy
Years of 
schooling
Household 
size Average age
Female 
ratio
Ratio of adults 
(age 15+)
Literacy rate 
of adult males
Literacy rate of 
adult females
Intercept 38.672*** 0.228*** 0.239*** 1.589*** 3.722*** 26.367*** 0.557*** 0.702*** 0.277*** 0.229***
[1.142] [0.063] [0.038] [0.246] [0.211] [1.238] [0.021] [0.026] [0.038] [0.037]
D 1 (dummy for Flexible 1) -0.536 -0.036 -0.017 -0.186 0.328 -1.302 -0.022 -0.045 0.009 -0.014
[1.296] [0.081] [0.045] [0.287] [0.257] [1.404] [0.026] [0.030] [0.047] [0.042]
D 2 (dummy for Flex. 1+IGA) -0.411 -0.117 0.006 -0.183 0.433 -2.166 -0.031 -0.039 0.030 0.108*
[1.376] [0.070] [0.070] [0.362] [0.280] [1.489] [0.023] [0.030] [0.057] [0.056]
D 3 (dummy for Flexible 2) -0.467 -0.058 -0.028 -0.189 0.431* -2.144 -0.044* -0.077** 0.007 0.050
[1.259] [0.078] [0.048] [0.307] [0.247] [1.326] [0.024] [0.029] [0.048] [0.046]
D 4 (dummy for non-borrower) -0.583 -0.022 -0.039 -0.198 0.078 0.246 -0.011 -0.016 0.019 0.001
[1.206] [0.063] [0.041] [0.273] [0.211] [1.333] [0.023] [0.030] [0.044] [0.041]
R 2 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.000 0.010
F -stat. for zero slopes of all dummies 0.06 1.54 0.44 0.14 2.59** 3.63*** 1.42 4.95*** 0.11 2.24*
F -stat. for zero slopes of D 1, D 2, and D 3 0.06 1.31 0.16 0.16 1.12 1.13 1.27 2.85** 0.10 2.86**
Number of observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,437 1,440 1,440 1,252 1,428
Dummy 
for 
owning 
the house 
land
Dummy for 
owning 
farm land
Size of 
operational 
farmland for 
aus
Size of 
operational 
farmland for 
aman
Total value of 
household 
assets (BDT)
Dummy for 
owning 
livestock 
animals
Number of cows 
and bulls owned
Number of 
goats and 
sheep owned
Number of 
chickens and ducks 
owned
Intercept 0.306*** 0.056** 0.567** 2.167*** 2.339*** 2827*** 0.656*** 0.378*** 0.464*** 2.961***
[0.093] [0.022] [0.276] [0.737] [0.792] [333] [0.076] [0.097] [0.128] [0.717]
D 1 (dummy for Flexible 1) 0.150 -0.033 0.956 0.242 1.294 425 0.039 0.117 0.042 0.250
[0.113] [0.023] [0.804] [1.160] [1.254] [527] [0.091] [0.139] [0.161] [0.837]
D 2 (dummy for Flex. 1+IGA) 0.072 -0.022 0.728 0.322 -1.022 613 -0.011 0.272 0.153 -0.561
[0.129] [0.029] [0.728] [1.518] [1.036] [473] [0.093] [0.230] [0.182] [0.838]
D 3 (dummy for Flexible 2) 0.125 -0.017 -0.147 -1.222 -0.861 411 -0.025 0.003 0.092 -0.192
[0.121] [0.029] [0.318] [0.834] [0.917] [395] [0.090] [0.121] [0.158] [0.812]
D 4 (dummy for non-borrower) 0.083 -0.014 0.753 0.186 0.553 381 -0.042 0.069 0.011 -0.689
[0.090] [0.023] [0.621] [1.162] [1.041] [319] [0.077] [0.110] [0.135] [0.676]
R 2 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.005
F -stat. for zero slopes of all dummies 0.67 0.88 1.01 1.17 1.82 0.50 1.19 0.61 0.43 1.81
F -stat. for zero slopes of D 1, D 2, and D 3 0.65 0.85 1.17 1.46 1.68 0.60 0.31 0.76 0.28 0.61
Number of observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Appendix Table 2: Balance Test at the Household Level
Source: Estimated by the authors, using the microdata described in the text.
C: Dependent variable: Landholdings
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in squared brackets. Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
A. Dep. variable: Characteristics of the head B. Dependent variable: Charactesitics of household members
D: Dependent variable: Liquid asset
(1)
VARIABLES Dummy for Attrition
Constant 0.003
(0.004)
Flexible 1 0.008
(0.008)
Flexible 1+ IGA 0.008
(0.013)
Flexible 2 0.010
(0.009)
Dummy for Non-borrower 0.006
(0.006)
Mean of the Dependent Variable 0.70
Observations 1,439
R-squared 0.002
F-stat. for zero slopes of treatment arms 0.75
F-stat 1.13
Control of Stratification No
Control for Credit Distribution Month No
Control for Household Characterestics No
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in brackets. 
Significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. 
Source: Estimated by the authors using the microdata described in the text.
Appendix Table 3: Attrition and Treatment Status
